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Abstract
This paper considers a buyer-seller contracting model in which the
seller possesses private information about all relevant aspects of the
state of nature, including how much each action is worth to the buyer.
We argue that, given asymmetric information, the buyer may not en-
tirely dismiss an unforeseen contingency claim by the seller. Then, if
the buyer lacks the foresight/awareness to “expect the unexpected”,
the model admits an equilibrium in which a seemingly complete con-
tract is written and then renegotiated along its outcome path to gen-
erate inefficiency ex post.
JEL Classification: C79, D82, D86, L14
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1 Introduction
Consider an owner of a building who wishes to install a new lift in her build-
ing. A potential seller tells the owner that two types of lifts are possible, A1
or A2, but she will find out which is the right choice only after conducting
some initial investigation. The contract, however, needs to be written now.
As is common with many such procurement contracts, it is only the
seller who observes, and then tells the buyer, which alternative best suits
the buyer’s needs. The uncertainty here concerns not merely the seller’s own
costs of installing different lifts; rather it involves all relevant aspects of the
environment, including how much each lift should be worth to the buyer.
The buyer and the seller therefore write a contract that postulates the terms
of trade contingent on the seller’s recommendation (as to which lift should
be installed).
Upon finishing the initial investigation, the seller however makes an unex-
pected announcement: the situation turns out to be unexpectedly complex,
and as a result, she cannot tell for sure which of the two lifts, A1 or A2, is
the correct choice. The seller then recommends another lift, say G, which is
a better option under these unforeseen circumstances.
What is crucial about this rather common story of renegotiation is asym-
metric information. After all, there is nothing abnormal about not being able
to foresee all relevant future contingencies, and moreover, the buyer has no
way of verifying whether or not the claim is true. Then, how can the buyer
dismiss for sure that the seller is not lying? Renegotiation may therefore
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happen even when the seller is making a false claim.
This paper formalises this kind of contracting situations which feature
asymmetric information and the possibility of unforeseen contingency. We
find that, modelled in the way described above, asymmetric information cou-
pled with a plausible behavioural assumption on the uninformed player’s
foresight/awareness of the environment can result in a seemingly complete
contract being written and then renegotiated along its outcome path to gen-
erate inefficiency ex post.
We therefore propose a fresh perspective on the role of renegotiation,
based on asymmetric information and unforeseen contingency. Our approach
departs from the traditional (complete information) contracting literature
which views renegotiation as a constraint on contracting and explains its
occurrence through some form of contractual incompleteness that it creates
(Maskin and Moore, 1999; Maskin and Tirole, 1999; Hart and Moore, 1999;
Segal, 1999; Che and Hausch, 1999). Also, in this literature, renegotiation is
assumed to be always efficient, and hence, the source of inefficiency is often
associated with the “hold up” problem ex ante (Hart, 1995).
To concretely illustrate our arguments, let us revisit the above example
with more details. There are two possible states of nature, and the state-
contingent payoff consequences of the three lifts are summarised in the table
below.
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State 1 State 2
A1 A2 G A1 A2 G
Buyer’s valuation 10 10 6 10 10 16
Seller’s cost 5 15 4 15 5 14
Net surplus 5 -5 2 -5 5 2
Thus, in one contingency, A1 embodies the highest tradeable surplus and
A2 the lowest; in the other contingency, A2 embodies the highest tradeable
surplus and A1 the lowest; G embodies an intermediate, non-contingent sur-
plus. Suppose that ex ante both parties (who are risk-neutral) believe that
the two states of nature are equally likely and that the seller will perfectly
observe the state when revealed.
The sequence of events is as follows. First, the seller offers a contract
which the buyer can accept or reject. The buyer’s reservation payoff, which
she obtains upon rejecting a contract offer, is zero. Second, the seller receives
a private signal about the state of nature and then sends a message to the
buyer. Third, the seller may opt to make a take-it-or-leave-it renegotiation
offer to the buyer. If the seller opts not to make a renegotiation offer, or if
she does make an offer which is rejected, the original contract is enforced.
Consider the following message contract: if the seller recommends A2,
trade A2 at price 10; otherwise, trade A1 at price 10. If the seller announces
the truth in each state, this contract clearly delivers the first-best and the
maximum possible payoff to the seller.
Suppose then that the seller encounters an unforeseen contingency and
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does not in fact observe the realised state, and hence, still believes that
the two states are equally likely. The seller informs this to the buyer and
asks to renegotiate, trading G at price 11 − ² for some ² ∈ (0, 2) instead
of trading A1 at price 10 as stipulated by the contract (the seller has not
recommended A2). Note that if the claimed unforeseen contingency were to
occur the seller would indeed prefer to renegotiate as such: under the original
contract her expected payoff is (10−5)+(10−15)
2
= 0, while under the terms of
the renegotiation the expected payoff is 11− ²− 14+4
2
= 2− ² > 0.
Given this, and since it is not possible to verify the seller’s claim, let us
assume that the buyer takes the (unexpected) message at its face value.1
She then accepts the renegotiation offer since her expected payoff from the
contracted trade is 0 while she obtains from the renegotiation 6+16
2
−(11−²) =
² > 0.
Moreover, the following is also true here. If the buyer were to respond in
such a way to the unforeseen contingency claim, then the seller would want
to renegotiate even if she were to observe state 1. To see this, note that in
this state the seller’s payoff under the original contract is 10 − 5 = 5, while
with the renegotiated deal it is (11−²)−4 = 7−² > 5 since ² ∈ (0, 2). It can
be readily verified that, if the seller observes state 2, she is better off staying
with the contract.
At the time of contracting, of course, it is not expected that the seller
1This is of course an extreme assumption. In the main analysis below, we consider the
general case in which the buyer ex post believes the seller’s unforeseen contingency claim
to be true with any (arbitrarily small) probability.
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will be unable to learn the identity of the optimal trading opportunity: this
is an unforeseen contingency. Therefore, the buyer may well not anticipate
that the seller could actually send such a message. This being the case, she
will agree to the original contract if offered, and the seller will indeed offer
it, knowing that, while she would stick with the contract in one of the two
foreseen contingencies, she would be able to induce renegotiation in the other.
The net effect is that we may well see a seemingly complete contract
being written and then renegotiated on the path of play, and moreover, the
renegotiation leads to an inefficient trade. The seller obtains a greater payoff
this way, compared to enforcing the contract and making the efficient trade
in each state, at the expense of the buyer whose actual expected payoff is
below her reservation payoff.
This insight is driven by the assumptions that (i) the buyer is unable
to verify the truth of a message when reported and (ii) the buyer lacks the
foresight to “expect the unexpected” and anticipate the possibility that the
seller claims not to have learned the realised state.
While the first asymmetric information assumption is prevalent, the sec-
ond assumption, which has a “behavioural” flavour, is also plausible because
of asymmetric information. What this assumption captures is the likely fact
that the uninformed buyer possesses limited knowledge of the environment.
For example, she may not be aware of the third alternative G in the first
instance and only later learns about its availability, presumably through the
seller’s “newly arrived” information. The seller, on the other hand, is an
experienced repeat player in the business, and therefore, should know more
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about the environment. It is also plausible that she should have better un-
derstanding of her customer’s behaviour (i.e. that the customer does not
expect an unforeseen contingency claim at the contract writing stage) than
the customer herself.
The rest of the paper presents a more general treatment of the above
ideas and results. In Section 2, we describe the basic model (in the spirit
of the “widget” models of Segal, 1999, Hart and Moore, 1999, and others),
without the possibility of unforeseen contingency and renegotiation, in which
asymmetric information poses no restriction to the scope of contracting and
efficiency. Section 3 then introduces our two key assumptions on the buyer’s
beliefs in response to an unforeseen contingency claim by the seller and on
the buyer’s limited awareness/foresight at the contract writing stage. The
extensive form concerning renegotiation and the equilibrium concept are also
spelled out in this section. In Section 4, the main results are presented. We
demonstrate that, even if the buyer believes an unforeseen contingency claim
to be true with an arbitrarily small probability, it is possible to find an
equilibrium in which a contract is written and then renegotiated along the
outcome path to generate an inefficient trade. Finally, Section 5 relates our
results to the recent literature on incomplete contracts and renegotiation in
closer detail. In particular, we argue that our analysis offers an explanation
for why individuals may indeed be reluctant to commit not to renegotiate.
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2 The Basic Model
Consider a situation in which two risk neutral players, buyer (B) and seller
(S), face a trade opportunity. Let j = B, S index a player. B requires one
unit of a widget from S. There are three widgets the players can choose from;
a1 and a2 are special widgets and g is the generic widget. Let us denote the
set of available widgets by A = {a1, a2, g} and its element by a.
There are two possible states of nature, indexed by θ, drawn from the
set Θ = {A1, A2} with equal probabilities. The two special widgets both
yield the same fixed valuation v to B in either state of nature. S’s costs of
producing these widgets, on the other hand, are determined by the realisation
of uncertainty. Let ci(θ) denote the cost of producing widget ai in state θ
(for i = 1, 2). For expositional simplicity, we impose a symmetric structure
over these parameters such that
c1 (A1) = c2 (A2) = c
c1 (A2) = c2 (A1) = cˆ ,
where v > c and cˆ > c > 0. Thus, widget a1 is “special” only in state A1,
while it is widget a2 which offers the high-surplus generating opportunity in
state A2.
Widget g is “generic” in that it yields the same surplus in all possible
states of nature. We shall denote the value of this surplus by G. Although
the surplus is fixed, g’s valuation and cost are state-dependent. We assume
that widget g yields both higher valuation and cost in A2 than in A1 (think of
the “gold-plated” and “cheap” imitation widgets suggested by Segal, 1999).
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Specifically, we assume
v1g − c1g = v2g − c2g ≡ G > 0 (1)
and
(v2g − v1g =) c2g − c1g = cˆ− c ≡ d > 0 , (2)
where vig and c
i
g are the valuation and cost of the generic widget in state Ai
(for i = 1, 2).
Notice here that (2) assumes the cross-state difference in the generic wid-
get’s payoff consequences to be exactly equal to that in the costs of producing
a special widget. This simplifies the analysis. As we shall see below, these
two parametric features of the model are critical determinants of the results,
but the central insights can be most economically conveyed with them treated
as one parameter.
We make two further assumptions about the nature of the problem. First,
a special widget, if traded in the right state, yields a greater surplus than
the generic widget.
Assumption 1 v − c > G.
Second, the generic widget surplus has the following lower bound.
Assumption 2 G > v − 1
2
(c+ cˆ).
This inequality implies that the generic widget performs better than a special
widget under uncertainty; that is, the fixed surplus G is greater than the
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expected surplus from trading either special widget. We shall henceforth
refer to this property of the generic widget as risk dominance.2
Assumptions 1 and 2 make the informational content a critical aspect of
the model. We shall invoke asymmetric information. We assume that the
realisation of uncertainty is observed only by S. In particular, the private
information postulated here involves all relevant aspects of the environment,
that is, all payoff consequences of all widgets. It is only S who learns these
from nature’s move.
A trade rule in our model is a mapping pi : Θ→ 2A\{∅}. Let a(θ) denote
the efficient widget in state θ. The first-best trade rule, denoted by pi∗, is
such that pi∗(θ) = {a(θ)} for each θ, thereby yielding the (maximum possible)
total surplus of v − c.
The main objective of the present paper is to investigate what can be
achieved by an ex ante contract. For this purpose, we make no explicit
description of the game that may be played in the absence of a contract,
such as some ex post bargaining game. We simply assume that, should the
players fail to agree on a contract, they proceed to obtain some reservation
payoffs, which are normalized to zero. There are always gains from engaging
in a trade with each other, but the opportunity arises only if the players
enter into a contractual relationship.3
2Notice here that from B’s perspective trading the generic widget under uncertainty is
risky while trading either special widget is not. This is a simplification. The analysis is
unaltered by making B’s valuation of each special widget also state-contingent.
3Many procurement contracts are consistent with this description. Another way to
justify the need for a contract is to incorporate ex ante relationship-specific investment
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Under the revelation principle, we focus on revelation contracts in which S
reports her private information. Let us define t = (a, p) as a trade specifying
a widget to be traded, a ∈ A, and its price, p ∈ R. Let T denote the set of all
such trades. A revelation contract, z, is then defined as a function z : Θ→ T
such that z(θ) ∈ T for each θ, specifying the terms of trade for each message.
The extensive form of the model is as follows. There are two stages. In
Stage 1, the players negotiate a contract. In particular, we assume that S
decides whether or not to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer of a contract which
B then either accepts or rejects. If a contract is agreed, we move to Stage 2.
If a contract is offered and rejected, or if S chooses not to offer a contract, the
game ends with the players getting their reservation payoffs. The sequence
of events in Stage 2 is as follows. At the beginning of the stage, nature draws
a state; then S sends a message θ ∈ Θ followed by production and trade
taking place according to the terms of trade stipulated by the contract.4 We
assume for now that the players can commit not to renegotiate.
Let Ez(θ) ⊆ A be the set of equilibrium outcomes of contract z in Stage
2 when the realised state is θ. (We shall later lay out more details about
the equilibrium concept when the possibility of unforeseen contingency and
renegotiation are introduced. The problem is trivial at this point.) We then
say that a contract z implements a trade rule pi if Ez(θ) ⊆ pi(θ) for all θ.
such that “hold-up” is a feature of null contract and ex post (re)negotiation. The trade
opportunities arise only if a sufficient level of investment is made up front but null contract
induces under-investment. The contracting problem is confined to the problem of ex post
incentives as it suffices to convey the idea of the paper.
4S’s production capacity is just one unit of a widget.
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Let zp define a revelation contract such that zp(θ) = (a(θ), p) for each θ.
The following result is trivial.
Proposition 1 For any p, zp implements pi∗. (S always reveals her private
information truthfully.)
Under the bargaining structure assumed for the contract negotiation
stage, an equilibrium contract of the model is one that gives S the maxi-
mum expected payoff while giving B her reservation payoff.5 It then follows
that:
Corollary 1 zv is an equilibrium contract of the model.
What we thus have here is a simple contracting model in which asym-
metric information does not limit the scope of contracting in any way. There
are substantial common interests here, and therefore, it is straightforward to
make the informed player always want to trade the correct widget. Notice
also that the generic widget plays no role whatsoever. As we shall shortly see,
however, the presence of this alternative plays an important role when we in-
troduce the possibility of unforeseen contingency and renegotiation. Having
such a simple, efficient benchmark will serve to highlight the impact of the
added features.
5A contract may of course generate multiple equilibrium outcomes with different pay-
offs. In what follows, however, the equilibrium contract generates a unique payoff to S.
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3 Unforeseen Contingency and Renegotiation
We now introduce the possibility of unforeseen contingency and renegotiation
to the basic model described above.
3.1 Behavioural Assumptions
In Stage 1, the players anticipate that S will perfectly learn the state of
nature when revealed. Consider now that, in Stage 2, having written a
contract, S claims an unforeseen contingency that she has not in fact been
able to observe the realised state, and therefore, is still equally uncertain as
to whether it is A1 or A2. How should B respond?
Although ex ante B does not foresee the possibility of such an event,
we take the stance that, ex post when S claims an unforeseen contingency,
B does not entirely dismiss the possibility that S may be telling the truth.
After all, it is a common practice not to anticipate all relevant contingencies,
and moreover, there is asymmetric information; B cannot actually verify S’s
claim.
In order to formally model this idea, let us first introduce some notation.
With slight abuse of notation, define Θ′ = {A1, A2, φ} as the set of seller
“types”, where A1 (A2) is the anticipated type who observes nature’s draw
and learns the state to be A1 (A2) and φ the unanticipated type who does
not observe nature’s draw. For expositional clarity, in what follows, θ will
index a type and σ will refer to a message. Also, define q as a probability
distribution on Θ′, and let Q denote the set of all such distributions.
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Then, we define B’s prior beliefs over the possible seller types, denoted
by ψ, as a mapping
ψ : ∅ ∪Θ′ → Q
such that ψ(σ) ∈ Q for any σ ∈ ∅ ∪ Θ′, where ∅ refers to no message. We
shall sometimes refer to ψ(∅) as B’s ex ante priors (held in Stage 1) and ψ(σ)
for any σ ∈ Θ′ as her ex post priors (held in Stage 2).
We now present our key assumption below.
Assumption 3 1. For any σ 6= φ, ψ(σ) = q∗ such that q∗(φ) = 0 and
q∗(A1) = q∗(A2) = 12 ; and
2. For σ = φ, ψ(σ) = q² such that q²(φ) = ² and q²(A1) = q
²(A2) =
1−²
2
for some ² ∈ (0, 1].
In other words, the players have common ex ante priors such that types
A1 and A2 are equally likely and type φ is impossible, but B’s ex post priors
change if S claims an unforeseen contingency that she has not observed the
realised state; in this case B forms a prior belief that there is a probability ² >
0 with which the unforseen contingency may actually take place. Note that
B does not realise the possibility of unforeseen contingency unless prompted;
the transformation in B’s priors is triggered only by message φ and not by
messages A1 or A2. Also, Assumption 3 concerns prior beliefs; as we shall
clarify below, B’s posterior beliefs will be formulated in the usual Bayesian
procedure from such priors and equilibrium strategies.
It is natural to treat ² as taking a small value. If it is large, or indeed
² = 1, Assumption 3 amounts to saying that B takes message φ at (near) its
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face value, which is less plausible and conveys more of a bounded rationality
flavour.6 However, we do not rule our this extreme possibility. As will be
shown below, the magnitude of ² does not affect the substantive contents of
the results.
Next, we make an additional assumption about the extent of the unin-
formed player’s forecasting capability/awareness of the environment.
Assumption 4 B does not “expect the unexpected”; that is, in Stage 1, B
anticipates only σ = A1 or σ = A2 in Stage 2. S knows this in Stage 1.
As argued earlier, we view this to be a plausible behavioural assumption,
particularly in light of the type of asymmetric information modelled. S can
be thought of as an experienced seller in the business possessing superior
knowledge of the environment than her customers who only seldom enter the
market. For instance, B may initially know only about the availability of the
two special widgets, while S knows that the generic widget is also available.
In such a relationship, it is also likely that the seller knows more about how
a customer behaves than the customer herself.7
6It is possible to interpret Assumption 3 as positing information processing errors.
However, we do not emphasise this view; rather, Assumption 3 seems a realistic description
of how an individual would respond to an unforeseen contingency claim that cannot be
verified. From the bounded rationality perspective, this paper may be considered related
to some recent papers that study the impact of information processing errors explicitly (for
example, Crawford, 2003; Eyster and Rabin, 2005; Ettinger and Jehiel, 2007), and also, to
the literature on non-partitional information structures (for example, Geanakoplos, 1989;
Brandenburger et al., 1992; Lipman, 1995; Rubinstein, 1998).
7Behavioural assumptions of similar flavour can be found in the recent literature on
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Finally, in Stage 1, both players maximise their expected payoffs in terms
of the common ex ante priors in which φ is an unforeseen contingency but S
takes account of the facts that her opponent’s ex post priors will change if
she claims an unforeseen contingency (Assumption 3) and that B does not
expect the unexpected (Assumption 4), while B only expects the anticipated
types A1 or A2. We clarify below how the players choose their behaviour in
Stage 2.
3.2 Contract, Renegotiation and Equilibrium
The assumptions asserted above naturally motivate renegotiation. In par-
ticular, we are interested in whether the informed player can exploit the
uninformed player’s imperfect awareness of the environment by writing a
contract that allows her to later pretend that the unforeseen contingency has
taken place and subsequently induce renegotiation to the inefficient generic
widget. Since the generic widget risk-dominates the special widgets, it is the
efficient widget to trade if S is telling the truth when announcing φ.
A contract is now defined by z : {A1, A2, φ} → T . Since type φ is not
expected by B (Assumption 4), a natural way to interpret φ as a contract
clause here is to think of it as representing non-announcement of either A1 or
A2 (assuming that this is itself verifiable). A contract then offers a complete
contracting with dynamically inconsistent preferences where the agents are assumed to be
“naive” and imperfectly aware of their future selves at the contract writing stage while
the principal correctly knows them. See, for example, O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999),
Dellavigna and Malmendier (2004) and Eliaz and Spiegler (2006).
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coverage of all possible contingencies: A1, A2 or else.
Moreover, a contract is subject to renegotiation. The following defines
the contract game. In Stage 2 (after a contract has been agreed and the state
of nature revealed), S first sends a message; subsequently B has an option to
propose a fresh take-it-or-leave-it offer of a trade which S can either accept
(Y ) or reject (N). If B makes a renegotiation offer and S rejects it, or if B
makes no renegotiation offer, the contract is enforced.8
Let us now define strategies and discuss the equilibrium notion for the
contract game with the possibility of unforeseen contingency and renegoti-
ation. We look for perfect Bayesian equilibria assuming that, within this
stage, B has full awareness of the environment. At the beginning of Stage
2 (after agreement of some contract), the players have common knowledge
about the possibility of unforeseen contingency and B’s beliefs in response to
message φ as in Assumption 3, compute an equilibrium of the contract game
and choose the strategies accordingly. Since B may now perceive that type
φ is a possibility, we must consider what that type would do in equilibrium
in order to pin down B’s post-φ behaviour and beliefs. B fully behaves as
an Bayesian updater.
We need to introduce some extra notation at this juncture. First, define
the set of all (partial) histories within the contract game relevant for actions
8A shaper result (in terms of uniqueness of the equilibrium set) is obtained if we
consider the alternative renegotiation process in which S gets to make an offer (see the
next section). However, since the proposed renegotiation works against B’s interests, we
shall present the case in which B has the bargaining power at renegotiation.
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as
H = {∅, (σ), (σ, t)}σ∈{A1,A2,φ},t∈T ,
where, with some abuse of notation, ∅ implies the beginning of the contract
game, (σ) refers to the partial history of message σ, and finally, (σ, t) refers
to the partial history of message σ followed by renegotiation offer t. Let h
index an element of this set.
Also, let us define
Hj = {h ∈ H| it is j’s turn to play after h}.
We thus have
HS = {∅, (σ, t)}σ∈{A1,A2,φ},t∈T and HB = {(σ)}σ∈{A1,A2,φ}.
We can then define S’s strategy as a mapping
fS : Θ
′ ×HS → {A1, A2, φ} ∪ Y ∪N
such that fS(θ, h) ∈ {A1, A2, φ}∪ Y ∪N for any (θ, h) ∈ Θ′×HS. We define
B’s strategy as a mapping
fB : HB → T ∪ ∅
such that fB(h) ∈ T ∪ ∅ for any h ∈ HB, where, with some further abuse of
notation, ∅ refers to no renegotiation offer.
We also want to define B’s posterior beliefs. Let µ(θ|h) denote her belief
after h ∈ HB that S is of type θ ∈ Θ′. Define µ ≡ {µ(θ|h)|θ ∈ Θ′, h ∈ HB}
as B’s belief system.
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Let Ez be the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria of the contract game
induced by contract z. Also let e = (fS, fB, µ) refer to a single perfect
Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). To constitute an equilibrium, fB has to be
such that, at every h ∈ HB, B chooses the optimal renegotiation offer given
the opponent strategies fS and her posterior (Bayesian) beliefs µ, and fS has
to be optimal for each type θ ∈ Θ′ at every h ∈ HS against fB and µ.
B’s equilibrium beliefs µ are formulated by the Bayes’ rule and the op-
ponent equilibrium strategies fS while being consistent with Assumption 3.
Since ψ(A1) = ψ(A2) = q
∗ such that q∗(φ) = 0, it must be that µ(φ|σ) = 0
for σ = A1, A2. On the other hand, since ψ(φ) = q
² such that q²(φ) = ²,
µ(φ|φ) may be positive depending on the equilibrium (and the contract).
For example, in a pooling equilibrium such that fS(θ, ∅) = φ for all θ ∈ Θ′,
we must have that µ(φ|φ) = ² and µ(A1|φ) = µ(A2|φ) = 1−²2 ; in a separat-
ing equilibrium such that fS(θ, ∅) = θ for each θ ∈ Θ′, we must have that
µ(φ|φ) = 1.
Finally, if we from now on say that a contract constitutes an equilibrium
contract of the model then we mean a contract that, under the additional
assumptions made in the previous sub-section, maximises S’s expected payoff
among the contracts that will be accepted if offered.
4 Main Result
Consider the following question: For any given ² ∈ (0, 1], does there exist
a contract which (i) B will accept if offered and (ii) induce an equilibrium
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in which renegotiation occurs on its outcome path and S expects a payoff
of at least v − c (the maximum possible surplus S can guarantee herself by
implementing the first-best trade rule pi∗)?
Let zˆ define the following contract:
zˆ :

σ = A1 → (a1, v)
σ = A2 → (a2, v)
σ = φ → (a1, v) .
An alternative, and more convincing, interpretation of this contract is:
CONTRACT: If S sends message A2, B and S trade a2 at price
v; otherwise, B and S trade a1 at price v.
It is straightforward to establish that in the absence of Assumption 3 this
contract will implement pi∗. Then, since B does not expect the unexpected
in Stage 1, her ex ante perceived payoff from this contract is equal to her
reservation payoff. Thus, we can make the following statement.
Remark 1 B accepts zˆ if offered in Stage 1.
We now characterise the set of PBEs of contract zˆ in Stage 2. In partic-
ular, it will be shown that, under certain parametric configurations, S has
incentives to induce renegotiation in state A1, but not in state A2, such that
the inefficient generic widget ends up getting traded; moreover, the resulting
surplus is distributed such that, despite sub-optimality of the total surplus
generated, S does better than (or at least as well as) what she would other-
wise obtain from always telling the truth and trading the efficient widget.
Let us first illustrate this in the special case where ² = 1.
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Proposition 2 Suppose that ² = 1. Then, there exists eˆ ∈ Ezˆ in which (i)
renegotiation occurs in state A1 such that S reports φ followed by trade of g
and (ii) the contract is enforced with trade of a2 in state A2. Also, in this
equilibrium, S’s expected payoff is v − c and B’s expected payoff is less than
zero.
Proof. Define uθ(t) as type θ seller’s payoff from making trade t. Let us
consider the following profile eˆ = (fˆS, fˆB, µ) where
1.
fˆS(θ, ∅) =
 φ if θ = A1 or φA2 if θ = A2
fˆS(θ, (σ, t)) =

Y if θ = A1 or A2 and uθ(t) ≥ v − c
Y if θ = φ and uθ(t) ≥ v − 12(c+ cˆ)
N otherwise
2.
fˆB(σ) =
 ∅ if σ = A1 or A2(g, pˆ) if σ = φ
where pˆ = v − c+ c1g
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3.
µ(A1|σ) =

1 if σ = A1
0 if σ = A2
0 if σ = φ
µ(A2|σ) =

0 if σ = A1
1 if σ = A2
0 if σ = φ
µ(φ|σ) =

0 if σ = A1
0 if σ = A2
1 if σ = φ .
First, it is straightforward to check that the beliefs are consistent with
Assumption 3 (for ² = 1) and the Bayes’ rule on the equilibrium path.
Second, let us check optimality of fˆB. It suffices to establish that fˆB(φ) =
(g, pˆ) is optimal. Since d ≡ cˆ− c = c2g − c1g, we have
uφ(g, pˆ) = pˆ− 1
2
(c1g + c
2
g)
= v − c+ c1g − c1g −
d
2
= v − 1
2
(c+ cˆ) ,
implying that fˆS(φ, (φ, g, pˆ)) = Y .
Thus, given fˆS and the beliefs µ (² = 1), renegotiation offer (g, pˆ) following
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φ will yield the following expected payoff to B: (using d ≡ cˆ− c = v2g − v1g)
1
2
(v1g + v
2
g)− pˆ = G− (v − c) +
d
2
= G−
[
v − 1
2
(c+ cˆ)
]
> 0 ,
where the last inequality follows from Assumption 2. Thus, we establish
optimality of fˆB(φ) = (g, pˆ).
Third, let us check optimality of fˆS. For each θ, the second part on the
responses to B’s renegotiation offers is obviously optimal, as is fˆS(φ, ∅) = φ.
It therefore remains to consider what each of the other types could obtain
from mimicking type φ.
Consider type A2. Given fˆB(φ) above, announcing message φ and accept-
ing the subsequent renegotiation offer gives her a payoff
pˆ− c2g = v − c+ c1g − c2g
= v − c− d
< v − c .
Thus, mimicking φ is not worthwhile for A2.
Consider type A1. Given fˆB(φ) above, announcing message φ and accept-
ing the subsequent renegotiation offer gives her a payoff
pˆ− c1g = v − c+ c1g − c1g
= v − c .
Thus, mimicking φ is optimal for A1. This completes the proof that eˆ ∈ Ezˆ.
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Finally, it is straightforward to show that the expected payoffs of the two
parties in the above equilibrium match the claim. ‖
The intuition for the above result is straightforward. B takes the face
value of the report that an unforeseen contingency has occurred and the
world is equally likely to be A1 or A2. Also, the generic widget risk-dominates
either special widget. Therefore, upon receiving message φ, B will make
a renegotiation offer to trade the generic widget instead of trading a1 as
stipulated by contract zˆ. Such renegotiation is worthwhile for S only in state
A1 because the cost of producing the generic widget is higher in state A2. In
fact, the difference in these costs across the states is sufficiently large (since
we assume c2g − c1g = cˆ − c) that the offered renegotiation price makes S
indifferent between renegotiating (and trading the inefficient generic widget)
and enforcing the contract (and trading the efficient special widget).
We now demonstrate that contract zˆ can admit the same type of equilib-
rium in the general case for any ² ∈ (0, 1). The additional requirement is that
d, which measures both the cross-state difference in the costs/valuations of
the generic widget and that in the costs of the special widgets, is sufficiently
large. We want the first of these two differences (c2g − c1g) to be large for the
same reason as in the special case above: in state A1, S needs to be getting
at least as much from renegotiating as from enforcing the contract. The sec-
ond difference (cˆ − c) needs to be large in order to make the renegotiation
worthwhile for B, who now believes upon receiving message φ that type φ is
possible with only a small probability.
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Proposition 3 For any ² ∈ (0, 1), there exists d¯ ∈ (0,∞) such that, if d ≥ d¯,
then there exists eˆ ∈ Ezˆ in which (i) renegotiation occurs in state A1 such
that S reports φ followed by trade of g and (ii) the contract is enforced with
trade of a2 in state A2. Also, in this equilibrium, S’s expected payoff is v− c
and B’s expected payoff is less than zero.
Proof. As before, define uθ(t) as type θ seller’s payoff from making trade
t. Fix any ² ∈ (0, 1). Also, define
d¯ ≡ (1 + ²)
²
(v − c−G) ,
and fix any d ≥ d¯. (Notice that d¯ > 0 given Assumption 1.)
Let us consider the following profile eˆ = (fˆS, fˆB, µ) where
1.
fˆS(θ, ∅) =
 φ if θ = A1 or φA2 if θ = A2
fˆS(θ, (σ, t)) =

Y if θ = A1 or A2 and uθ(t) ≥ v − c
Y if θ = φ and uθ(t) ≥ v − 12(c+ cˆ)
N otherwise
2.
fˆB(σ) =
 ∅ if σ = A1 or A2(g, pˆ) if σ = φ
where pˆ = v − c+ c1g
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3.
µ(A1|σ) =

1 if σ = A1
0 if σ = A2
1−²
1+²
if σ = φ
µ(A2|σ) =

0 if σ = A1
1 if σ = A2
0 if σ = φ
µ(φ|σ) =

0 if σ = A1
0 if σ = A2
2²
1+²
if σ = φ .
First, it is straightforward to check that the beliefs are consistent with
Assumption 3 and the Bayes’ rule on the equilibrium path.
Second, let us check optimality of fˆB. Given fˆS and µ, fˆB(A1) and fˆB(A2)
are obviously optimal. Let us consider the remaining part of B’s strategy.
Since d ≡ cˆ− c = c2g − c1g, we have
uφ(g, pˆ) = pˆ− 1
2
(c1g + c
2
g)
= v − c+ c1g − c1g −
d
2
= v − 1
2
(c+ cˆ) (3)
and
uA1(g, pˆ) = pˆ− c1g
= v − c . (4)
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This implies that renegotiation offer (g, pˆ) would be accepted by both type
φ and type A1. Notice also that fˆS(φ, (φ, g, p)) = N and fˆS(A1, (φ, g, p)) = N
for any p < pˆ.
Thus, given fˆS and µ, renegotiation offer (g, pˆ) following message φ will
yield the following expected payoff to B: (using d ≡ cˆ− c = v2g − v1g)
µ(A1|φ)(v1g − pˆ) + µ(A2|φ)(v2g − pˆ) + µ(φ|φ)
[
1
2
(v1g + v
2
g)− pˆ
]
= v1g − pˆ+
²d
1 + ²
= v1g − v + c− c1g +
²d
1 + ²
= G− (v − c) + ²d
1 + ²
≥ 0 ,
where the last inequality follows from d ≥ d¯. Thus, we establish optimality
of fˆB(φ) = (g, pˆ).
Third, let us check optimality of fˆS. For each θ, the second part on the
responses to B’s renegotiation offers is obviously optimal. Let us consider the
first part on the message choice. Given fˆB, (3), (4) and µ, it is straightforward
to check optimality of fˆS(φ, ∅) and fˆS(A1, ∅) as above. For the remainder, it
suffices to show that for type A2 it is not worthwhile to mimic type φ. By
sending message φ and accepting the subsequent renegotiation offer (g, pˆ),
type A2 would get a payoff
pˆ− c2g = v − c+ c1g − c2g = v − c− d < v − c ,
which establishes just that. This completes the proof that eˆ ∈ Ezˆ.
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Finally, it is straightforward to show that the expected payoffs of the two
parties in the above equilibrium match the claim. ‖
Notice that the equilibrium eˆ established above in Propositions 2 and 3 is
not the unique PBE of contract zˆ because, in stateA1, S is actually indifferent
between reporting the truth and claiming the unforeseen contingency; both
yield a payoff v − c. This means that there also exists a fully separating
equilibrium in which the contract is enforced to deliver the efficient trade in
both states A1 and A2. However, it is easily seen that there cannot be any
other equilibrium outcome (and payoff to S). The reason is that, given the
higher cost of producing the generic widget, type A2 would never want to
mimic type φ, and therefore, pooling can only occur between types A1 and
φ as in the posited equilibrium.
Nonetheless, we emphasise the reported equilibrium, and renegotiation,
for the following reasons. First, the multiplicity of equilibria is no longer an
issue if we consider an alternative extensive form for the contract game and
allow instead S to make a take-it-or-leave-it renegotiation offer (as in fact
assumed for the example discussed in Introduction). In this case, from the
proof of Proposition 2 above, it is straightforward to show that, with suffi-
ciently large d, there cannot be a fully separating equilibrium since otherwise
type A1 could become strictly better off by deviating to mimic type φ and
induce renegotiation. Thus, we can derive a unique PBE which implements
the same trades as reported in Propositions 2 and 3 above and gives S an
expected payoff strictly greater than v − c.
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Second, we can also break the indifference and eliminate the fully separat-
ing equilibrium by relaxing the parametric assumption that d ≡ c2g−c1g = cˆ−c,
which was made to simplify the analysis. If the two differences (c2g − c1g and
cˆ−c) are treated independently, and if we have c2g−c1g > cˆ−c and these differ-
ences are sufficiently large (given any ²), contract zˆ has a unique equilibrium
which features inefficient renegotiation just as above.
It is obvious that contract zˆ generates the highest possible payoff for S
among all the contracts that are acceptable to B. Thus, we can put together
Remark 2 and Propositions 2 and 3 to state the following Corollary.
Corollary 2 For any ² ∈ (0, 1], there exists d¯ ∈ [0,∞) such that, if d ≥ d¯,
then zˆ is an equilibrium contract of the model.
Let us summarise our result. S possesses private information not just
on her own costs of producing different widgets but also on how much each
widget is worth to B. Moreover, B lacks the foresight/awareness to expect
the unexpected at the contract writing stage, that S may later claim an
unforeseen contingency. These two features allow S to induce agreement of a
contract which will be renegotiated along its outcome path. In one of the two
(foreseen) states, S falsely claims an unforeseen contingency and recommends
a new action, which is in fact inefficient. Since the claim cannot be verified, B
does not entirely dismiss it and attaches a small probability that S is telling
the truth. Indeed, given the right parameters, there is a price at which such
renegotiation is optimal for both parties. Despite inefficiency, this leads to S
earning more than (or at least as much as) what she could otherwise obtain
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from truthfully revealing her information and enforcing the contract to trade
the efficient widget. Renegotiation makes B worse off.
5 Commitment Not To Renegotiate
Our results are closely related to the recent literature on incomplete con-
tracts and commitment not to renegotiate. In the traditional contract-
ing/implementation models, renegotiation is treated as a constraint affecting
the scope of off-the-equilibrium punishments (Maskin and Moore, 1999). In
some cases, this goes as far as being the critical factor in driving optimality
of null, hence incomplete, contracts.
The debate between Maskin and Tirole (1999), henceforth MT, and Hart
and Moore (1999), henceforth HM, is particularly relevant to us. MT de-
fine unforeseen contingencies in terms of ex ante (in)describability of actions
(widgets) and argue that, modelled as such, unforeseen contingencies per se
need not constrain the scope of contracting as long as the contracting par-
ties can forecast their payoff consequences. Clever message contracts can be
devised such that the details of unforeseen contingencies are filled in ex post
and correct incentives provided. However, this irrelevance result rests criti-
cally on the no-renegotiation assumption. HM show that, when the players
cannot commit not to renegotiate, ex ante indescribability of future events
can indeed generate optimal incomplete contracts.9
9Renegotiation is also responsible for incomplete contracts when the contracting en-
vironment is sufficiently complex (Segal, 1999) and when there are co-operative ex ante
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But, if renegotiation is such an important source of contractual incom-
pleteness and inefficiency, why is it so prevalent? This observation is puzzling
because the theory suggests an ample reason for individuals to bind them-
selves not to renegotiate when writing a contract, even in the presence of
unforeseen contingencies (for example, by involving a third party). We now
argue that our analysis offers an explanation for why individuals may indeed
be reluctant to rule out renegotiation.
Consider S offering the following contract to B:
CONTRACT: If S sends message A1 (A2), B and S trade a1 (a2)
at price v; otherwise, S pays B a large penalty.
Notice that this contract effectively shuts off any chance of renegotiation
(provided that the penalty is large enough) and achieves the first-best.
However, we have shown that this contract may not emerge in equilibrium
of the model. In the equilibrium that we identify, the players agree on a
contract which is renegotiated along its outcome path; in other words, the
players choose not to commit not to renegotiate. This results from the seller
exploiting her superior informational position and her trading partner’s lack
of foresight/awareness.
It is also worth mentioning that the aforementioned literature on incom-
plete contracts and renegotiation assumes that the players have complete
information and renegotiation always yields an efficient outcome ex post.
Thus, renegotiation is often associated with inefficiency ex ante such as the
relationship-specific investments (Che and Hausch, 1999).
32
hold up problem. In contrast, notice that the type of renegotiation postulated
here generates inefficiency ex post.10
Finally, how incomplete is the equilibrium contract highlighted in this
paper? On the one hand, it is complete in the sense that it accounts for all
the relevant contingencies (message φ is part of a contract). At the same
time, however, the contract fails to be renegotiation-proof, and this may be
viewed as a symptom of incompleteness.
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